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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effect of the deployment of United Nations Blue Helmets 
on economic activity in South Sudan with a special focus on agricultural production 
Since UN troops are predicted to improve security, in particular, we expect a positive 
relationship between deployment of UN blue Helmets and cereal production. We test 
our hypothesis using an original dataset including all the 78 South Sudanese 
counties over the period 2009-2011. We control for the non-random assignment of UN 
troops through an Instrumental Variables approach. Our empirical results show that 
a 10% increase in the size of the troop allows the production of additional 600 tonnes. 
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1. Introduction 
Peacekeeping is an international public good whose benefits are supposed to accrue 
to a variety of actors (Morrissey et al., 2002). At national level, peacekeeping is 
expected to provide the most relevant benefits because of enhanced security for local 
population. In addition it must be considered that peacekeeping - by decreasing 
insecurity - provides benefits also to regional neighbourhoods and to the whole world 
community (Sandler, 2002). The aim of this paper is to study the national benefits, 
namely the economic impact of peacekeeping on local economy. In particular, this 
paper focuses on the impact of peacekeeping on agricultural production in South 
Sudan.  
South Sudan is the newest country in the World, established on 9 July, 2011. 
Independence was affirmed after a referendum held in January 2011, which 
declared secession from Sudan. In the last sixty years they fought two civil wars, the 
first one from 1955 through 1972 and the second one from 1983 through 2005. 
Nowadays, they are still involved in skirmishes along the border caused by land 
claims. In December 2013, a political power struggle broke out between President 
Salva Kiir and his ex-deputy Riek Machar, accused of attempting a coup d'état. This 
led to a sectarian conflict, with rebels targeting members of Mr Kiir's Dinka ethnic 
group and government soldiers attacking Nuers.1Needless to say, violence interplays 
with technological underdevelopment, thwarting South Sudan's progress. Insecurity 
discourages the economic activity and has a negative impact on agricultural 
production. In 2005 the United Nations started a peacekeeping mission in South 
Sudan, named UNMIS, and since then Blue Helmets have been in the country. The 
primary goal of UN troops is to enforce peace among fighting groups. In addition, 
this may also be expected to have a benign impact on productive activities. In fact, a 
                                                          
1 Up to 10,000 people are estimated to have been killed in the inter-ethnic Dinka-Nuer fighting, more 
than 1,000,000 people have been displaced inside South Sudan and more than 400,000 people have 
fled to neighboring countries. On 27 May 2014, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 
2155 (2014) to reprioritize the mandate of UNMISS towards the protection of civilians, human rights 
monitoring and support for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and increased the Mission's 
troop strength to 12,500 and a police component to up to 1,323 personnel. 
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lower degree of conflict is expected to entail the possibility of restarting production 
and investment. The question we address in this paper is: do really UN troops have 
a beneficial impact on agricultural production? In particular, do UN troops secure 
crops in South Sudan? South Sudan is a suitable testing ground for our study, 
because it has been largely reported that the enduring conflict depressed its 
agricultural performance (World Bank, 2013). From a geo-morphological point of 
view, the country is divided into six agro-ecological zones offering a diversity of 
agricultural potential (maize, sorghum, wheat, and so on), abundance of water 
resources as rainfall, lakes and rivers. Despite this potential, the cereal production 
seldom meets the demand. The poor quality of productive inputs and support 
services, the low and inefficient technology, and eventually the lack of infrastructure 
constitute a severe limit to production and contribute to reduce the yield. 
Furthermore, it has been often reported that militia attacks often destroy the 
crop and the livestock. Farming households are therefore discouraged because of the 
widespread insecurity and cultivate only the land close to their home (Johnson, 
2011). Only less than 5% than the 30 million hectares of arable land in the country 
is harvested. In fact, more than a third of South Sudanese in 2010 suffered from 
moderately or severely food insecurity; among them, severe child acute malnutrition 
is about 13% (World Bank,2013). The fiscal revenues of South Sudanese government 
almost totally depend on oil royalties (98%), thus making the state capacity 
interdependent with international oil prices, which are volatile. Outside the oil 
sector, livelihoods are concentrated in low productive, unpaid agriculture and 
pastoralists work, accounting for 15% of GDP. In fact, 85% of the working 
population is engaged in non-wage work, mainly in agriculture (78%). The per capita 
GDP in 2013 was $1,085. The economy is strongly dependent from aid: from 2007 to 
2013 donors’ commitments have totalled about $4.5 billion, excluding $4 billion in 
contributions to UNMISS peacekeeping for the same period (World Bank, 2013).  
In this paper we empirically analyze the relationship between the deployment 
of United Nations Blue Helmets in South Sudan and cereal production in order to 
4 
 
uncover a relation between these variables. The issue has not been tackled so far in 
the literature, and it is not a trivial one. First, Blue Helmets are expected to 
positively affect agricultural production, as their formal mission is 'consolidate peace 
and security' (art. 3 UN Resolution 1996, 2011). The channels through which a 
beneficial impact is predictable are: (i) a enhanced feeling of security; (ii) a direct 
demand of tradable goods and foodstuff of UN personnel.     
The provision of security should induce workers to exert more effort in 
agricultural production because lower conflict reduces the risk of expropriation and 
the makes the act of going in the field less perilous for the worker itself. Once 
deployed in the country, however, Blue Helmets are also expected to purchase 
consumer goods so fuelling the local demand and eventually increasing the actual 
sales prices of many primary goods.  
An additional aspect is crucial. The UN troops' deployment may be non-
random. The assignment of Blue Helmets to counties' headquarters reasonably 
follows a rationale. For example, the troops are sent where the largest number of 
conflict-related incidents had taken place.2 Alternatively, those areas where 
infrastructures are more developed and it is easier to get food are preferred to more 
peripheral and desolate counties. If the deployment scheme implemented is 
correlated with the output variable, i.e. cereal production, our estimates will be 
biased. To consider this issue we employ an Instrumental Variable approach, 
finding valid instruments for the size of the troop. 
The results of the estimates support our hypothesis: there exists a significant 
relationship between the deployment of UN troops and cereal production, and it is 
positive. The estimated marginal effect, robust to alternative specifications of the 
model, is about +0.6%. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the small 
literature on the effects of peacekeeping, whereas Section 3 describes the history of 
                                                          
2 Gledistch and Beardsley (2014) show how peacekeepers are able to contain conflict in specific 
wartorn subnational areas.  
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South Sudan and the UN mandate for peacekeeping. Section 4 introduces the 
empirical specification and the data; in Section 5 results are presented, and Section 
6 concludes. 
 
2. The economic effects of peacekeeping interventions  
Although the economic analysis of peacekeeping is a developed field of research (for 
overviews see Solomon (2007), Bove and Smith (2011) and Dorussen (2014)), the 
issue of the economic effects of peacekeeping is in its infancy. In fact, the economic 
analysis of peacekeeping mainly deals with the following issues: (a) the demand side 
of peacekeeping operations (the conflict situations that invite peacekeeping 
interventions), (b) the supply peacekeeping (namely the willingness and incentives 
of a country to participate into a PKO), (c) the outcome of peacekeeping operations; 
(d) the cost of peacekeeping operations. In particular, pioneering discussions on the 
costs of peacekeeping are in Arrow (1994) and in Klein and Marwah (1996).  
Evidence on burden sharing is provided in Shimizu and Sandler (2003), suggesting 
that peacekeeping has a relatively large share of purely public benefits, leading to 
some `exploitation of the large by the small'. Jyoti et al. (1999) first studied the 
determinants of UN peacekeeping contributions for the period 1975-
1996.Gaibullovev et al. (2009) analyze the determinants of UN and non-UN 
peacekeeping interventions. Bove (2011) and Bove and Elia (2011) study the supply 
side of peacekeeping. All these articles empirically show that specific characteristics 
of participating countries explain the supply of peacekeeping especially in non-UN 
operations. Put differently, potential gains of participating countries matter more 
than potential benefits of war-torn areas. On the size of UN missions, Ruggeri et al. 
(2013) find a size effect, namely rebel groups and local governments are more willing 
to cooperate with larger UN missions.  
As noted above, less attention has been paid to the impact of peacekeeping on 
economic development and sustainability of countries when deployment of troops 
has taken place.  The economic impact of peacekeeping ought to be, in fact, the study 
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of how war-torn economies can be restored to their capacity of stimulating economic 
development thanks to security spillover generated after the peacekeeping has 
taken place. This appears to be particularly appropriate when taking into account 
that modern peacekeeping is multidimensional (Dorussen and Gizelis, 2013).  
In fact, peacekeeping is a public good whose benefits accrue to a variety of 
actors. First there are some localized benefits that are directly linked to the 
conceptual framework envisioned in Brauer and Caruso (2013). Peacekeeping 
should be first expected to: (1) provide a security spillover that would enhance 
incentives of entrepreneurs and laborers to be involved into an ordinary economic 
activity rather than in appropriation activities; (2) involve also economic policies 
able to contribute to the economic reconstruction of the violence-afflicted country. In 
this respect the economic study of peacekeeping falls within the domain of peace 
economics as defined in Isard (1994), Tinbergen (1994), Arrow (1995), and Caruso 
(2010).  
The first issue is linked with development economics that emphasizes the role 
of property rights in shaping the incentives for investments and therefore increasing 
income. Since the seminal work by North (1991), the relevance of institutions 
securing effective property rights is now unchallenged. Besley and Gathak (2009) 
show the role of property rights in reducing the risk of expropriation and that 
insecure property rights act as a barrier to trade reducing related gains. Avinash 
Dixit (2009), in his Presidential Address at the American Economic Association, 
claims that economic governance is important for markets and economic activity, 
and it provides three essential prerequisites for them: security of property rights, 
enforcement of contracts and collective action. Peacekeeping in fact is also related to 
this strand of literature. In fact, by increasing security peacekeeping contributes to 
enhance state capacity3 and provide a working system of property rights. It may 
represent a point of departure for enabling the country to address the social and 
                                                          
3 Chowdury and Murshed (2013) show that disruption of state capacity in wartorn societies.  
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economic problems which are pervasive in both war torn societies. … In this respect 
the nature of public good is clear-cut. In fact, most of the features discussed above 
show non-rival and non-excludable characteristics. In particular, whenever 
peacekeeping turns to be successful, it contributes to generate an institutional 
setting which eventually may turn to be foster economic development in the long 
run.       
To the best of our knowledge only a few studies have been published on this 
aspect of peacekeeping. Carnahan et al. (2006) claim that United Nations missions 
do more good than harm, in economic terms, than is commonly believed because 
there is an immediate upsurge in economic activity associated with the restoration 
of basic security. More directly, less than 10 percent of mission spending goes 
directly into the local economy, and 20 percent of mission procurement goes into the 
local economy. Instead, the perception of widespread inflation is not borne out, 
although some price rises occur in parts of the economy servicing internationals, and 
wages for scarce skilled labor increase. In fact, there are five areas where the ways 
in which the United Nations operates have negative consequences for the 
development of local economies: (1) the host government’s revenue administration 
and the integrity of the revenue system is undermined by the way in which the 
United Nations Convention on Privileges and Immunities is applied; (2) the way in 
which a mission operates can establish expectations for both professional working 
environments and personal living standards that cannot be affordably sustained by 
a developing country; (3) missions make policy decisions without understanding the 
broader impact on the local economy; (4) the planning horizons with which the 
mission operates often lead to inefficient capital investment choices and increased 
costs for the host government after the mission leaves; (5) there is uneven 
distribution of economic impact by geographic area and ethnic group. 
Related to the topic is the paper by Amara (2012) that considers the 
stabilization of Iraq, which - strictly speaking - is not a form of peacekeeping. The 
United States used a combination of economic, political, and mainly military means 
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(the “surge”, an increase in 30,000 troops to about160,000) to stabilize Iraq. Amara 
uses structural change tests to determine the effect of the intervention on security 
and economic metrics of success. There is little evidence suggesting that the surge 
was the primary intervention that enhanced economic development and political 
order.  
In what follows we aim to contribute to this niche literature by providing 
empirical evidence on the impact of UN peacekeeping operations in South Sudan on 
agricultural production.  
 
3. Peacekeeping in South Sudan 
The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was deployed in 2005 after the 
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of 
Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM),4 ending more than 20 
years of war. The Naivasha Agreement established South Sudan as an autonomous 
region of Sudan, and the mandate of the CPA consisted of four main issues: 
implementation of ceasefire between North and South Sudan; facilitation of the 
delivery of humanitarian aid; assistance to demining, and protection of civilians and 
human rights, including a safe return of internally displaced peoples and refugees.5 
The military strength of UNMIS comprised of approximately 10,000 peacekeepers. 
The mission was decentralised in terms of its deployment locations and 
management structures. The strategic headquarters were based in Khartoum. The 
majority of staff (about 6,000 people) was deployed across the 10 States of South 
Sudan, including the county level as required (United Nations, 2011a). Table A.1 in 
the Appendix illustrates the administrative division of the country. 
The peace process stopped in 2009, when tensions between the ruling 
National Congress Party and the SLPM accompanied a wave of armed violence. 
Tribal conflict affected mainly the Jonglei and Upper Nile states. The Government 
                                                          
4 On the evolution of SPLM see Metelis (2004). 
5 See Security Council Resolution 1590.  
9 
 
of South Sudan has been unable to restore security, and the politicization of the 
violence increased (McEvoy and LeBrun, 2010). The timing of the incidents followed 
the electoral timing: the executive elections in April 2010 have been preceded by 
tribal violence in Jonglei, Lakes, Upper Nile and Warrap states. Isolated cases of 
post-election violence were limited to a few states, such as Jonglei and Unity (CIGI 
Security Reform Monitor, 4/2011). The SPLM has been accused of undue influence 
for having mobilized security organs, including the army, to intimidate candidates. 
In this confused scenario several armed groups emerged (the Lord Resistance Army, 
the Joint Integrated Units, and others) and exerted pressure on the government. In 
January 2011 the independence of South Sudan was formalized with a referendum 
that obtained almost unanimous agreement: more than 98% of the voters choose to 
create a new state, separated from Sudan. On 9th July, after the culmination of a 
six-year peace process, South Sudan finally became a new country. 
Khartoum's government, once accepted the independence of South Sudan, 
withdrew its consent for UNMIS to continue. At the same time, the mission turned 
into the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), with 
the adoption of resolution 1996(2011).6 The Security Council authorized 7,000 
military and a 900 civilian police personnel force for UNMISS, now headquartered 
in Juba, from contributing countries such as India, China, Bangladesh, Kenya and 
Russia which were divided into three sectors I-III7; each sector having the same area 
of responsibility as it did during UNMIS. 
UNMISS’s mandate is to “support the Government of the Republic of South 
Sudan in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation, and 
resolution and protect civilians”.8 The UNMISS peacekeepers, therefore, have been 
entrusted with two distinct responsibilities – firstly to consolidate peace in the 
                                                          
6 United Nations (2011b). 
7 Sector III seems to be the most high risk area in terms of threats. Sector III has three active RMG 
(rebel militia groups). RMG Mattew Pul Jang in Unity, RMG Ogat and Olony in Upper Nile and 
South Sudan Democratic Movement (SSDM) under Lt Gen Chol Awan in Jonglei (UNMISS, 2011b).  
8 For details on UNMISS mandates, see official UNMISS (2011a).  
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nascent state as a pre-requisite for state building and economic development, and 
secondly to assist government authorities in exercising their responsibilities to 
prevent and mitigate armed conflict and protect civilians (William, 2011: 8). The 
Southern Sudanese government initially objected to a Chapter VII mandate, 
allowing UNMISS to undertake operations to protect civilians, because the 
government wanted the UN to focus more on the problems lying with the contested 
northern border rather than internal security problems. Nonetheless, conflict 
between South Sudanese groups is strong, yielding to some 2,500 killings and the 
displacement of 350,000 people (Mc Evoy and LeBrun, 2010). Moreover, security 
provided by the blue helmets is critical to long-term stability and economic 
development, not least because of the vast agricultural plains but also because of 
natural resources of oil, agricultural land, water, Gum Arabic, and minerals 
(Arenas-Garcia, 2010: 5). 
Figure 1 maps the diffusion of Blue helmets in the country. UN troops are 
located in only fourteen counties over 78, and their deployment does not follow any 
clear spatial pattern. The Blue Helmets are both in the north (e.g. Melut) and in the 
south (e.g. Yei), in large counties (e.g. Raga) and in smaller ones (e.g. Rumbek 
Centre), in coastal (e.g. Yambio) and internal areas (e.g. Bor South).  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Figure 2 provides details on the size of the county troops and their evolution 
in time. First, one must note that the deployment of Blue Helmets in a country is a 
permanent policy: during the period 2007-2011 we do not observe changes in the 
deployment of the troops. This is an expected pattern, because once the headquarter 
is established, it is costly to remove it or move it somewhere else; fixed costs, 
communication networks and infrastructures contribute to reduce the mobility of 
the troops. The largest share of the Blue Helmets is deployed in the three regional 
capitals: Juba, which is also the national capital, Wau and Malakal. At the same 
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time, we do not observe any diffusion of the presence of troops across counties, and 
their size is quite stable. The only significant variation is observed in the last two 
years, when a reorganization of the troops occurred. Figure 2 indicates a reduction 
of Blue Helmets in some counties (e.g. Wau and Malakal) counterbalanced by an 
increase in others counties (e.g. Raja and Bor South). A plausible motivation for this 
reshuffle is that rising violence was expected in 2011, due to the approaching of the 
referendum. Instead of establishing new headquarters, it seems that the command 
rationalized the composition of the troops. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
4. The dataset and the model 
 This work exploits an original dataset consisting of all the 78 counties of 
South Sudan. For the purpose of estimating a cereal production function, we 
collected data from institutional sources (e.g. National Bureau of Statistics) and 
international organizations (e.g. OCHA in Juba). All these information compose an 
unbalanced panel dataset for the period 2007-2011, made of 390 observations. The 
variables included refer to demographic, socio-economic and geographical 
characteristics of the country, beside the already mentioned information on the 
location and the size of UN troops. 
Our dependent variable is the net cereal production measured in tonnes 
(Cereal). The data is calculated by the South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS) for the years 2008-2011 and it is available at the county level. The 
explanatory variables refer to the input of the production. First, we include the 
surface of the harvested land (Total cereal area), measured in hectares. The source 
is again NBS Statistical Yearbook. We expect that the wider is the cultivated area, 
the greater is the output we observe. Unfortunately, information on the amount of 
physical capital and fertilizers is not available, but it seems they play a marginal 
role in agricultural production. FAO/WFP (2012: 9) reports that ''farmers commonly 
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use their own seed saved from the previous year's harvest, and virtually no 
commercial fertilizers, pesticides or herbicides are used''. Technology is highly 
underdeveloped and all operations from sowing to harvesting are done manually. 
Land preparation exploits some mechanized processes, but the dominance of very 
low skilled workers prevents the introduction of advanced tools as modern ploughs. 
Therefore, the second main input for cereal production is human labor. Since 
smallholder farming dominates agricultural sector in South Sudan (Oakland 
Institute, 2011), we include Population and the Surface area of each county. We 
expect that, ceteris paribus, larger counties are able to produce a larger amount of 
output. Nonetheless, the soil is a good subject to rivalry in consumption, and when 
the population's density increases, congestion and excessive exploitation could 
reduce the yield. Finally, Rainfall is included in the specification, as drought 
threatens the crops in South Sudan. We introduced also the square term of rainfall, 
because non linearity better fits the climatic variables (Hsiang, 2013). 
A key assumption of our analysis is that security affects productivity. To 
illustrate this point we consider two farming households, H1 and H2, endowed with 
two identical pieces of land, the same skills, the same ploughs and the same 
fertilizers. If H1 experiences a shock to the security of his piece of land, his output 
decreases. The reduction could be either direct (as an example a militia attack that 
destroys part of the crops), or indirect (cattle raids, physical violence and destruction 
of the ploughs that discourage the farming activity). Following this line of reasoning, 
conflict-reducing devices as the deployment of UN troops should reduce the security 
gap between H1 and H2, constraining the detrimental impact of the conflict on the 
agricultural production. This effect is captured by our variable of interest, Blue 
Helmets, which measures the number of UN soldiers headquartered in a county. 
Finally, we include some control variables: a dummy indicating the presence of a 
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dominating ethnic group in the county9 (Ethnicity), the presence of the Dinka ethnic 
group dummy (Dinka), civil-war related killings per thousands of individuals 
(Killings). Table 1 summarizes data description and sources, whereas Table 2 
provides summary statistics. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Then, we estimate the following model: 
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where the subscript i=1,...,78 indicates the county, t= 2008, ...., 2011 indicates the 
year, Xit is the vector of control variables, µi are county effects, θt are year effects and 
εit is a random error. 
We suspect that the troops deployment is non-randomly chosen, therefore 
Blue Helmets induces endogeneity in the specification. We tackle this issue by 
estimating an Instrumental Variable model. In particular, we exploit two 
instruments for Blue Helmets. The first one is Roads, a proxy for the feasibility of 
the settlement; in fact, the presence of communication networks guarantees the 
possibility to provide primary goods to the headquarters, and make them easily 
reachable. The presence of roads is not a trivial issue in South Sudan, in fact OCHA 
reports that many countries are not connected through main roads, while the capital 
Juba is connected by only four main roads.10 The second instrument we employ is an 
                                                          
9 Dinka is the dominant ethnic group in South Sudan, we experimented with a dummy equal to one 
when this group account for more than 40% of the population in a given province (and zero otherwise) 
but it was never significant.  
10 The development of roads is a priority for the World Bank that promoted the Rural Roads Project 
for South Sudan in 2012 in the amount of US$38 million. The project will help to support the 
country's attempts to develop its untapped agricultural potential to improve the livelihood of the 
rural population, reduce food insecurity, improve basic services delivery and ensure peace. The 
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interactive term State capital dummy*distance, where Distance measures how far is 
in km the State capital from Juba. This variable is equal to zero for non-state capital 
counties, and equal to a positive number otherwise. The larger the value of this 
interactive term, the more distant the state capital county is from the country 
capital. The rationale for this instrument is twofold: first, a state capital is the core 
of local administration, providing the headquarter with some already existing 
networks that facilitate the execution of the mission; secondly, infrastructures and 
international communication networks are more developed in Juba, therefore it is 
easier to transfer and manage troops around its area. 
Figures 3 to 6 map the distribution of our dependent variable, cereal 
production. The reference point is the group dark yellow, which indicates the 
median counties: 50% of counties produce more than them, and 50% produce less. 
Accordingly, the light green group has 10% of counties producing less than them and 
90% of counties performing better than them. The interpretation of the other groups 
is similar. The figures show that that cereal production is quite erratic over the 
years; the median production level experiences a dramatic fall in 2009 (-38%), 
followed by a recovery in 2010 (+25%) and again a decrease in 2011 (-20%). 
Furthermore, it is difficult to identify areas that are systematically more productive 
than others. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
[Figure 4 about here] 
[Figure 5 about here] 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
5. Results 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
support will help respond to the development challenges by providing reliable access to high 
agricultural production areas and enhancing agricultural marketing. The project will help the rural 
population in the project area to have access to market, employment opportunities, and to social and 
administrative services.  
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Table 3 presents the results from the IV estimation of Equation 1. Continuous 
variables are expressed in logs; therefore the coefficients are interpreted as 
marginal effects. Moreover, all the specifications include regional dummies to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity, and year dummies to capture the effect of 
time. The fit of the models is always very high, with a R2 of about 0.9. The number 
of observations is limited to 233 because of missing data. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Before commenting the results, it is important to notice that the IV 
diagnostics support our specification. Both under-identification11 and over-
identification12 are always rejected, and indicate that we are using a suitable 
specification and that our instruments are valid. The same conclusion is drawn by 
observing the coefficients of the first stage regressions in Appendix A.2: except for 
the models 8 and 10 where also Killings is significant, our two instruments are the 
unique determinants of Blue Helmets. 
The coefficients of Table 3 are consistent across the six models, and the main 
result is that, ceteris paribus, we find a significantly positive effect of the UN troops 
on cereal production. The coefficient indicates that a 1% increase in the ratio brings 
about an increase of cereal production of about 0.6%. In other words, if we assume a 
net cereal production of 10,000 tonnes and the presence of 100 Blue Helmets, a 10% 
increase in the size of the troop allows the production of additional 600 tonnes. The 
coefficient associated to the labour-related variable, Population, is always negative 
as expected. As the number of individuals, keeping the harvested surface constant, 
the less fertile becomes the land, and the less efficient is the use of the soil. An 
increase (decrease) of the cultivated land, Total cereal area, on the other hand, 
increases (decreases) the output by a factor larger than one, verifying the 
                                                          
11 The null hypothesis of the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic is that the model is under-identified. 
12 The null hypothesis of the Hansen J test is that the model is not over-identified. 
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predictions. Interestingly, the results find increasing returns to scale in the use of 
land in our dataset. Rainfall is positively associated to the crops, but its significance 
level is not robust across the models. The suspected non linearity, moreover, is nor 
verified. This results is probably justified by the very low degree of precipitations in 
the country. 
The ethnicity dummies, Ethnicity and Dinka, are not significant but always 
negative. Although the Dinka tribe is devoted to agriculture and sheep farming, it is 
the dominant ethnic group in the country and this 'governmental' status might 
generate tension with the other groups, negatively affecting the harvest. 
The Killings variable is not significant as well, and negative as expected. A 
larger number of conflict-related victims increases insecurity and discourages the 
agricultural activity. Nonetheless, we must note that the incidence of killings is very 
limited, ranging from 0 to 3.6 per thousands of inhabitants, reducing the 
significance of its coefficient. Furthermore, insecurity is affected also by armed raids 
that cause injured, refugees, loss of livestock and dwellings destruction, whose 
impact is not captured by Killing. Finally, the year dummies are highly significant 
and, consistently with official data from NBS, indicate that if compared to 2011, 
production was higher in both 2009 and 2010. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper empirically tested the hypothesis that UN troops contributed to secure 
crops in South Sudan during the period 2008-2011. We use an original dataset 
including all the 78 South Sudanese counties and estimate an augmented cereal 
production function that includes the Blue Helmets as an independent variable. We 
control for the non-random assignment of UN troops through an Instrumental 
Variables approach, and find the expected beneficial effect of the deployment of UN 
troops on agricultural output. The coefficient associated to the variable of interest in 
fact indicates a marginal effect of about 0.6%. In other words, if we assume a net 
cereal production of 10,000 tonnes and the presence of 100 Blue Helmets, a 10% 
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increase in the size of the troop allows the production of additional 600 tonnes. This 
effect is non-negligible in the light of the widespread food insecurity that strikes the 
country and the dependence from food imports of the whole region. 
Drawing on the literature in political economy, we claim that this increase 
happens because of two channels of transmissions. Peacekeeping provides security 
at two different levels: at the micro level reducing conflict it lowers the risk of 
expropriation from militia groups at the level of the individual farmer, at the macro 
level it provides some public goods that are needed in order to escape from state 
fragility, such as governance, enforcement of contracts which are non-rival and non-
excludable in nature. These features are conducive to the restart of productive 
activities that were halted during the conflict.     
Our results suggest that beside the usual humanitarian and political reasons 
behind peacekeeping, we should also consider an economic role for these missions in 
evaluating their costs and benefits.  
The analysis developed in this paper is the first empirical evaluation of the 
performance of UN troops in South Sudan, and the results are possibly idiosyncratic 
to the characteristics of this country. Future research is called to test the same 
hypothesis in different environments and answer to the more general question: do 
conflict-reducing policies actually improve the economic performance of a country 
afflicted by violence and insecurity? 
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Table 1 - Data description and sources 
Variable Description Source 
Cereal  Net cereal production in tonnes Statistical Yearbook, NBS. Years 2009-2011 
Blue Helmets Number of UN soldiers physically stationed in the county OCHA in Juba 
Households Number of households in the county Statistical Yearbook, NBS. Years 2009-2011 
Share farming households Share of farming households on the total number of 
households 
Statistical Yearbook, NBS. Years 2009-2011 
Total cereal area Harvested area in hectares Statistical Yearbook, NBS. Years 2009-2011 
Ethnicity Dummy=1 if the county is multi-ethnical, dummy=0 
otherwise 
OCHA in Juba 
Killing Number of conflict-related deaths per thousands of 
individuals 
OCHA in Juba, and www.sudantribune.com 
Population Population size Statistical Yearbook, NBS. Years 2009-2011 
2010 dummy Dummy=1 if year==2010, dummy=0 otherwise Own calculations 
2011 dummy Dummy=1 if year==2011, dummy=0 otherwise Own calculations 
Rain Average rainfall World Food Program (WFP) and NBS 
State capital  
Dummy 
Dummy=1 if the county is a state capital, dummy=0 
otherwise 
Statistical Yearbook, NBS. Years 2009-2011 
Distance from Juba Km distance from the county capital to the state capital Statistical Yearbook, NBS. Years 2009-2011 
Note: OCHA= Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; NBS=South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics; 
WFP=World Food Program.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Cereal 312 9,016.43 9,176.51 0 79,976 
Blue Helmets 390 64.39 223.43 0 1,271 
Population 386 107,199.4 65,991.44 10,077 397,594 
Surface area 389 7,489.06 5,584.14 737.7 33,273.2 
Rainfall 312 8.57 2.17 4 13 
Ethnicity 390 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Dinka dummy 390 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Killing/thousand population 311 0.20 0.51 0 3.63 
Total cereal area 234 10,986.31 7,412.51 681 33,908 
Bahr-el-Ghazal dummy 390 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Equatoria dummy 390 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Roads 390 1.21 0.90 0 4 
Distance from Juba 390 560.54 265.15 0 1,070 
State capital 390 0.13 0.33 0 1 
State capital*distance 390 61.65 189.27 0 834 
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Table 3. Second stage estimation of Equation 1 
Dep. Var: ln Cereal  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Ln Blu Helmets 0.007* 0.007** 0.007** 0.006** 0.006* 0.006* 0.006** 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ln Population -0.268*** -0.285*** -0.279*** -0.264*** -0.266*** -0.266*** -0.265*** -0.261*** -0.267*** -0.263*** -0.262*** 
(0.077) (0.075) (0.066) (0.068) (0.079) (0.079) (0.075) (0.074) (0.077) (0.076) (0.082) 
Ln Rainfall 0.194* 0.114 0.039 0.025* 0.199* 0.201** 0.190* 0.193* 0.196* 
(0.104) (0.099) (0.061) (0.014) (0.102) (0.100) (0.101) (0.100) (0.104) 
Ln Rainfall2 -0.001 
(0.004) 
Ln Total cereal area 1.229*** 1.241*** 1.106*** 1.104*** 1.227*** 1.226*** 1.226*** 1.224*** 1.227*** 1.225*** 1.218*** 
(0.061) (0.059) (0.080) (0.080) (0.062) (0.061) (0.059) (0.059) (0.061) (0.061) (0.069) 
Ln Cereal, t-1 0.139*** 0.130** 
(0.052) (0.052) 
Bahr-el-Ghazal dummy 0.415*** 0.428*** 0.366*** 0.356*** 0.412*** 0.415*** 0.415*** 0.406*** 0.433*** 0.424*** 0.420*** 
(0.066) (0.067) (0.068) (0.068) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064) 
Equatoria dummy 0.357*** 0.371*** 0.336*** 0.320*** 0.346*** 0.342*** 0.359*** 0.347*** 0.350*** 0.339*** 0.362*** 
(0.044) (0.046) (0.045) (0.044) (0.055) (0.045) (0.049) (0.050) (0.046) (0.047) (0.045) 
2009 dummy 0.127** 0.120** 0.107* 0.110** 0.127** 0.126** 0.127** 0.119** 0.127** 0.120** 0.127** 
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
2010 dummy 0.247*** 0.263*** 0.302*** 0.293*** 0.246*** 0.246*** 0.247*** 0.238*** 0.247*** 0.239*** 0.248*** 
(0.042) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Ethnicity -0.009 -0.008 
(0.047) (0.047) 
Killing/thousand population -0.034 -0.034 
(0.057) (0.057) 
Dinka dummy -0.032 -0.031 
(0.053) (0.053) 
Ln surface area 0.021 
(0.031) 
Constant -0.120 0.083 0.238 0.006 0.007 0.068 -0.144 -0.162 -0.106 -0.125 -0.290 
(0.633) (0.629) (0.558) (0.568) (0.567) (0.568) (0.623) (0.621) (0.620) (0.618) (0.769) 
Observations 233 233 232 232 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 
R-squared 0.914 0.913 0.917 0.917 0.914 0.914 0.914 0.914 0.914 0.914 0.914 
Underid test p-value 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.003 
Overid test p-value 0.104 0.154 0.090 0.060 0.102 0.103 0.094 0.107 0.090 0.104 0.135 
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Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 4. First stage estimation of Equation 1 
Dep Var: ln Blue Helmets (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Ln Population 3.989 3.721 3.631 3.913 4.537 4.323 3.827 3.931 3.975 4.080 4.455 
 
(3.366) (3.352) (3.274) (3.278) (3.362) (3.408) (3.300) (3.282) (3.350) (3.332) (3.343) 
Ln Surface area 
          
1.661 
           
(1.080) 
Ln Rainfall 5.521 
  
6.955 
  
4.923 4.843 5.621 5.573 5.410 
 
(4.555) 
  
(4.777) 
  
(4.494) (4.506) (4.513) (4.520) (4.443) 
Ln  Rainfall, t-1 
 
4.668 6.210 
        
  
(4.596) (4.789) 
        
Ln Rainfall 
    
-4.112 0.895 
     
     
(2.823) (0.630) 
     
Ln  Rainfall2 
    
0.291 
      
     
(0.178) 
      
Ln Cereal, t-1 
  
-2.252 -2.285 
       
   
(1.441) (1.432) 
       
Ln Total cereal area -1.616 -1.416 0.755 0.566 -2.162 -1.842 -1.440 -1.510 -1.606 -1.679 -2.473 
 
(2.759) (2.736) (2.767) (2.793) (2.785) (2.781) (2.685) (2.683) (2.755) (2.749) (2.862) 
Ethnicity 
      
1.907 1.983 
   
       
(2.108) (2.108) 
   
Dinka dummy 
        
1.197 1.262 
 
         
(3.120) (3.113) 
 
Killing/thousand population 
       
-1.218* 
 
-1.164* 
 
        
(0.722) 
 
(0.686) 
 
Bahr-el-Ghazal dummy -4.321* -4.178* -3.174 -3.270 -3.668 -4.564* -4.404* -4.650* -4.965 -5.231 -3.877* 
 
(2.337) (2.344) (2.243) (2.240) (2.301) (2.338) (2.382) (2.405) (3.570) (3.610) (2.240) 
Equatoria dummy -1.464 -1.323 -0.759 -0.839 -3.897 -2.289 -2.101 -2.554 -1.241 -1.637 -1.065 
 
(2.334) (2.303) (2.222) (2.248) (2.658) (2.304) (2.431) (2.496) (2.245) (2.308) (2.306) 
2009 dummy -0.178 -0.383 -0.163 0.107 -0.237 -0.166 -0.179 -0.444 -0.189 -0.443 -0.161 
 
(0.375) (0.379) (0.418) (0.437) (0.376) (0.376) (0.374) (0.436) (0.379) (0.439) (0.382) 
2010 dummy -0.256 0.268 -0.357 -1.054 -0.306 -0.313 -0.249 -0.548 -0.263 -0.550 -0.164 
 
(0.495) (0.691) (0.751) (0.702) (0.495) (0.494) (0.493) (0.531) (0.498) (0.535) (0.505) 
Roads 3.527** 3.651** 3.692*** 3.561** 3.494** 3.407** 3.823** 3.888** 3.608** 3.663** 3.650** 
 
(1.441) (1.437) (1.396) (1.403) (1.456) (1.438) (1.474) (1.480) (1.419) (1.424) (1.421) 
Statecap_dist 0.0283*** 0.0284*** 0.0284*** 0.0283*** 0.0278*** 0.0280*** 0.0284*** 0.0279*** 0.0280*** 0.0276*** 0.0279*** 
 
(0.008 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant -64.48** -61.91** -64.53** -66.78** -40.89* -61.70** -64.36** -64.15** -64.99** -64.82** -76.68*** 
 
(26.60) (27.11) (26.46) (25.98) (24.13) (23.70) (26.01) (25.92) (26.37) (26.28) (28.10) 
Observations 233 233 232 232 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 
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R-squared 0.466 0.463 0.471 0.474 0.484 0.471 0.472 0.475 0.467 0.471 0.475 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1. Presence of UN troops by county 
 
Source: Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Juba. 
 
 
Figure 2. Yearly deployment of UN troops by county 
 
 
Source: Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Juba. 
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Figure 3 - Net cereal production by county, year 2008 
 
Source: South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics, NBS. 
 
Figure 4 - Net cereal production by county, year 2009 
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Source: South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics, NBS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 - Net cereal production by county, year 2010 
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Source: South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics, NBS. 
 
Figure 6 - Net cereal production by county, year 2011 
 
Source: South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics, NBS. 
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APPENDIX 
A.1 List of Regions, States and Counties of South Sudan 
Region Greater Upper Nile Bahr el Ghazal Equatoria 
State Upper Nile Jonglei Unity Warrap Northern 
Bahr el 
Ghazal 
Western 
Bahr el 
Ghazal 
Lakes Western 
Equatoria 
Central 
Equatoria 
Eastern 
Equatoria 
Counties Baliet Akobo Abiemnhom Gogrial East Aweil Centre Jur River Awerial Ezo Juba Budi 
  Fashoda Ayod Guit Gogrial 
West 
Aweil East Raja Cueibet Ibba Kajo-Keji Ikotos 
  Longochuk Bor South Koch Tonj East Aweil North Wau Rumbek 
Centre 
Maridi Lainya Kapoeta East 
  Luakpiny/Nasir Canal 
(Khorflus) 
Leer Tonj North Aweil South 
 
Rumbek East Mundri 
East 
Morobo Kapoeta 
North 
  Maban Duk Mayendit Tonj South Aweil West 
 
Rumbek 
North 
Mundri 
West 
Terekeka Kapoeta 
South 
  Maiwut Fangak Mayom Twic   Wulu Mvolo Yei Lopa/Lafon 
  Malakal Nyirol Panyijar    Yirol East Nagero  Magwi 
  Manyo Pariang Rubkona    Yirol West Nzara  Torit 
  Melut Pibor        Tambura   
  Panyikang Pochalla        Yambio   
  Renk Twic East           
  Ulang Uror                 
Note: Juba is the country capital; regional capitals are in bold, state capital are underscored. 
 
